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Constitutional Law. Cranston Police Retirees Action Comm. v.
City of Cranston, 208 A.3d 557 (R.I. 2019). A municipality’s
temporary suspension of pensioners’ cost-of-living-adjustment
benefit is constitutional, so long as such suspension is “reasonable
and necessary” and serves a “significant and legitimate public
purpose” under the circumstances.1
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In 1937, the City of Cranston (the City) implemented a pension
plan for the City’s retired police officers and firefighters.2 By the
early 1980s, however, the pension plan had become a “significant
financial concern” for the City.3 In the 1990s, attempts were made
by the City’s then-mayor, Michael Traficante (Mayor Traficante), to
rectify this issue by meeting with police and firefighter union
representatives.4 Subsequently, in 1996, the City and the union
representatives came to an agreement where the City would pass
two ordinances (the 1996 ordinances), that would create a twotiered pension plan.5 The City’s financial problems, however, did
not subside with the adoption of the 1996 ordinances and, by July
1, 1999, the City’s unfunded, accrued pension liability exceeded
$169 million.6 The issue worsened during the early 2000s, when

1. Cranston Police Retirees Action Comm. v. City of Cranston, 208 A.3d
557, 577–79 (R.I. 2019).
2. Id. at 565.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. Under the 1996 ordinances, any members of the police and fire
departments that were hired after July 1, 1995, would be enrolled in the state’s
pension plan, and members with five or fewer years of service had the option
to enroll in the City’s pension plan or the state’s pension plan. Id. at 565–66.
Under the City’s pension plan, the 1996 ordinances provided remaining
members a minimum three percent compounded cost-of-living adjustment, or,
in the alternative, “a percentage equal to that of a contractual increase for
active members.” Id.
6. Id. at 566.
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Mayor Traficante’s successor, Mayor John O’Leary, borrowed
against the City’s pension fund to cover the cost of the then-retirees’
health care and base pensions.7 By the time Mayor Allan Fung
(Mayor Fung) took office in 2009, the City was in severe economic
turmoil and implemented several measures to try and resolve its
financial situation.8
In 2011, the Rhode Island General Assembly passed the Rhode
Island Retirement Security Act (the Act), in an attempt to promote
the sustainability of municipal pension systems.9 The Act provides
that a municipality’s pension plan is in “critical status” if, “as
determined by its actuary, as of the beginning of the plan year, a
plan’s funded percentage for such plan year was less than sixty
percent (60%).”10 By June 2011, the City’s pension plan fell within
the Act’s sixty percent threshold for “critical status” when its
unfunded accrued liability rose to $256 million and was funded at
a mere 16.9%.11 The City notified the plan’s participants of the
pension system’s “critical status” and began to work on developing
an alternative funding plan that was consistent with the Act’s
requirements.12 In developing that plan, the City considered
several options such as raising taxes, cutting personnel, and
terminating a number of city services.13 During a meeting with
City pensioners in September 2012, Mayor Fung suggested that a
ten-year cost-of-living-adjustment suspension in the form of two
ordinances (the 2013 ordinances), was the City’s preferred option of
rehabilitating the pension plan from “critical status.”14 After
7. Id.
8. Id. “The City made cuts to personnel, eliminated city vehicles, and
increased health care co-shares for its employees.” Id.
9. Id. See 45 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-65-2.
10. Cranston Police Retirees Action Comm., 208 A.3d at 566 (quoting § 4565-4). The Act provides that if a city’s pension plan is in “critical status,” the
city is required “(1) to give notice of such status to plan participants and other
listed individuals and entities and (2) to submit a funding improvement plan
detailing the municipality’s strategy for emerging from that status.” Id.
(quoting § 45-65-6). The Act also provides that “the funding improvement
period should not exceed 20 years with the plan emerging from critical status
within that timeframe” and that municipalities who fail to do this will suffer a
reduction in state aid. Id. (quoting § 45-65-7).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 566–67.
13. Id. at 567.
14. Id.
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withdrawing the proposed ordinances in an effort to negotiate with
the pensioners, the City eventually decided to enact the 2013
ordinances, thereby suspending the minimum three percent costof-living adjustment for ten years.15
As a result, the Cranston Police Department Retirees
Association, Inc. (CPDRA), and Local 1363 Retirees Association
filed a suit against the City seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief, arguing that the enactment of the 2013 ordinances violated
both the state and federal constitutions, a state statute, and
constituted a breach of contract.16 The City and pensioners did,
however, reach an agreement whereby the cost-of-living
adjustment would be suspended in alternating years, with a 1.5%
cost-of-living adjustment payment in the eleventh and twelfth
years.17 The retirees were also offered the option to initiate a civil
proceeding against the City.18 The plaintiff here is a group of
CPDRA members that were participants in the City’s pension plan
and who opted out of the aforementioned agreement (collectively,
Plaintiff).19
The Plaintiff subsequently filed an eight-count
complaint in Rhode Island Superior Court, where judgment was
entered in favor of the City upholding the 2013 ordinances.20 The
Plaintiff timely appealed.21
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court (the Court) sought to
determine whether the 2013 ordinances enacted by the City
violated multiple Rhode Island and United States constitutional
provisions, the Rhode Island “Open Meeting Act,” and constituted
a breach of contract.22 The Court first addressed the Plaintiff’s
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 557.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 571. In addition to these claims, the Plaintiff raised several other
issues on appeal, arguing that the trial court erred in its decision to apply a
less deferential standard when analyzing the City’s evidence regarding the
reasonableness and necessity of the 2013 ordnances; granting the City’s motion
for summary judgment as to the Plaintiff’s res judicata claim; granting the
City’s motion for a protective order; granting the Non-City defendants’ motion
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claim that the trial justice erred in finding for the City as to
whether the enactment of the 2013 ordinances violated the
Contract Clauses of the state and federal constitutions.23 The
Court reviewed this issue de novo because it is a "question[] of law
that may implicate a constitutional right"24, however, the Court
explained that it “will not disturb the factual findings made by a
trial justice sitting without a jury ‘unless such findings are clearly
erroneous or unless the trial justice misconceived or overlooked
material evidence.’”25
The Contract Clause prevents a state from enacting laws that
“impair[] the obligation of contracts.”26 The Court, however, made
clear that “[a]lthough the Contract Clause appears literally to
proscribe ‘any’ impairment, the prohibition is not an absolute one
and is not to be read with literal exactness like a mathematical
formula.”27 The Court applied the United States Supreme Court’s
three-part test for analyzing Contract Clause claims.28 Because the
trial justice found that the Plaintiff satisfied its burden to show that
the 2013 ordinances resulted in a substantial impairment of its
contractual rights, the Court focused primarily on the third prong
of the Contract Clause analysis.29 The Plaintiff argued on appeal
for summary judgment on all counts; granting the City’s motion to amend its
answer; and granting the City’s motion for costs. Id. This Survey focuses on
the constitutional and statutory claims only.
23. Id.
24. Id. (quoting Goetz v. LUVRAJ, LLC, 986 A.2d 1012, 1016 (R.I. 2010)).
25. Id. (quoting Gregoire v. Baird Props., LLC, 138 A.3d 182, 191
(R.I.2016)).
26. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 12).
27. Id. (quoting U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 21 (1977))
(internal quotations omitted).
28. Id. at 572 (citing Nonnenmacher v. City of Warwick, 722 A.2d 1199,
1202 (R.I. 1999)) (“A court first must determine whether a contract exists.
Second, if a contract exists, the court then must determine whether the
modification results in an impairment of that contact and, if so, whether this
impairment can be characterized as substantial. Finally, if it is determined
that the impairment is substantial, the court then must inquire whether the
impairment, nonetheless, is reasonable and necessary to fulfill an important
public purpose.”).
29. See id. at 572–74. The Court did not address the City’s argument that
the trial justice erred in determining that the Plaintiff satisfied its burden of
proof that it had a contractual right because the City failed to file a crossmotion on that issue, and, thus, the issue was not properly before the Court.
Id. at 575.
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that the trial justice erred in determining that there was a
“significant and legitimate public purpose” for the contractual
impairment.30 The Court stated that if a governmental action
constitutes a “substantial impairment” of a contract, there must be
a “significant and legitimate pubic purpose” to justify the
impairment.31
The Court explained that a “significant and legitimate public
purpose” does not exist in every circumstance; particularly when
the state action is in response to economic issues.32 Therefore, if a
state enacted a regulation merely for “the financial benefit of the
sovereign,” then no “significant and legitimate public purpose”
exists.33 Here, however, the Court agreed with the trial justice that
the City provided sufficient evidence that a “significant and
legitimate public purpose” existed to justify the enactment of the
2013 ordnances.34 Specifically, the Court noted that the 2013
ordinances were not intended simply for the “financial benefit of the
sovereign,”35 but were enacted in response to the City’s dire
financial situation which was caused by a number of factors not
within the City’s control.36 Moreover, the Court reasoned that
protection of a City’s pension plan is incredibly important to the
pensioners who benefit from the system, thus the 2013 ordinances
served a “significant and legitimate public purpose.”37
The Court then addressed Plaintiff’s claim that the 2013
ordinances were neither “reasonable” nor “necessary.”38 Although
courts generally “defer to legislative judgment as to the necessity
and reasonableness of a particular measure,” if a government

30. Id. at 575.
31. Id. (quoting Energy Reserve Grp., Inc., v. Kansas Power & Light Co.,
459 U.S. 400, 411–12 (1983)).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 576 (quoting Buffalo Teachers Fed’n v. Tobe, 464 F.3d 362, 368
(2d Cir. 2006)).
34. Id.
35. Id. (quoting Buffalo Teachers Fed’n, 464 F3d at 368).
36. Id. The court noted that the most critical factor was the severe
recession in the years leading up to the enactment of the 2013 ordinances. Id.
The trial justice noted that this historic recession “had far reaching and
devastating economic and general social consequences for the City.” Id.
37. Id. at 576–577.
38. Id. at 577.
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action impairs the obligation of its own contract, the municipality
will be afforded “less deference.” 39 However,
for [an] impairment to be reasonable and necessary under
less deference scrutiny, it must be shown that the state did
not (1) consider impairing the contracts on par with other
policy alternatives or (2) impose a drastic impairment
when an evident and more moderate course would serve its
purpose equally well, nor (3) act unreasonably in light of
the surrounding circumstances.40
Moreover, the degree of the contractual impairment is a “relevant
factor in determining its reasonableness.”41
On appeal, the Plaintiff argued that if a foreseeable problem
changes only in degree and not in kind between the time the
contract is made and the attempted impairment is proposed, the
impairment is not reasonable.42 Thus, the Plaintiff asserted that
because the pension’s underfunding existed well before the 2013
ordinances were enacted, the mere fact that the situation worsened
did not make the City’s contractual impairment reasonable.43 The
Court, however, reasoned that although the Plaintiff was correct
that the 2013 ordinances were enacted well after the pension’s
underfunding began, the City’s financial situation was significantly
impacted by several factors prior to the enactment of the 2013
ordinances.44 Additionally, the Court agreed with the trial justice
that the City adequately considered possible alternatives such as
“raising taxes, making more cuts to city personnel, and drastically
reducing city services.”45 However, due to the degree of the City’s
underfunding issue, any budget reduction or tax increase would

39. Id. (quoting U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 23
(1977)).
40. Id. (quoting Buffalo Teachers Federation, 464 F.3d at 371) (emphasis
in original) (internal quotations omitted).
41. Id. (quoting Buffalo Teachers Federation, 464 F.3d at 371) (internal
quotations omitted).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 577–78. Specifically, the Court noted that the City’s serious
economic condition, reduction in state aid, and recent flooding problem
contributed to the City’s underfunding issue. Id.
45. Id. at 578.
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have had to be significant.46 Lastly, the Court agreed that because
the 2013 ordinances resulted in the suspension of a “future” benefit
for a fixed period of time, this contractual impairment was
“narrowly tailored” to the problem it set out to address.47 Thus, the
Court found no error in the trial justice’s finding that the
contractual impairment—the 2013 ordinances—was “reasonable
and necessary” under the circumstances.48
The Court next sought to determine whether the trial justice
erred in granting the City’s motion for summary judgment as to the
Plaintiff’s argument that the 2013 ordinances violated both the
state and federal Takings Clauses.49 The Court reviewed the trial
justice’s grant of the City’s motion for summary judgment de novo,
and would affirm the decision only if the Court concluded that no
genuine issue of material fact existed regarding the Plaintiff’s
takings claim.50 The Takings Clauses of the Rhode Island and
United States Constitutions prohibit the government from taking
private property for public use “without just compensation.”51 The
Court did not have to consider whether the Plaintiff had a
“recognizable property right” at stake because it was undisputed
that the 2013 ordinances’ “lifetime language” regarding the cost-ofliving adjustment benefit conferred a vested benefit upon the
pensioners.52
The Court then proceeded to determine whether the ten-year
suspension of the cost-of-living adjustment benefit resulted in a
physical or regulatory taking requiring just compensation.53
“Physical takings . . . occur when the government physically takes
possession of an interest in property for some public purpose” thus
necessitating compensation.54 Contrastingly, a regulatory taking
occurs when the government places a significant restriction on an
owner’s use or enjoyment of his property for which just
46. Id.
47. Id. (emphasis in original).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 580.
50. Id. at 580–81 (quoting Cancel v. City of Providence, 187 A.3d 347, 349
(R.I. 2018)).
51. Id. at 581 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 16).
52. Id.
53. See id. at 581–82.
54. Id. at 581 (quoting Buffalo Teachers Fed’n v. Tobe, 464 F.3d 362, 374
(2d Cir. 2006)).
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compensation is required.55 Regulatory takings are further divided
into categorical and non-categorical.56 A non-categorical taking
occurs when the taking results in anything short of a complete
elimination of an individual’s property value and is determined in
accordance with the framework first established in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York.57 In Penn Central, the
Supreme Court established three factors that must be considered
when addressing a regulatory taking claim: “(1) the economic
impact of the regulation on the claimant; (2) the extent to which the
regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations; and (3) the character of the governmental action.”58
The Court agreed with the trial justice that, because the 2013
ordinances were temporary and did not result in the City physically
taking back any payments already made to the Plaintiff, this was,
if anything, a regulatory taking and must be decided by applying
the Penn Central framework.59 In doing so, the Court noted that
the primary question in this analysis is whether the governmental
regulation “goes too far.”60 However, the Court also noted that a
governmental regulation by its very nature involves the adjustment
of rights for the public’s benefit, and that “[g]overnment hardly
could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not
be diminished without paying for every such change in the general
law.”61
The Court then considered the extent to which the 2013
ordinances interfered with the Plaintiff’s investment-backed
expectations.62 The Court reasoned that although the 2013
ordinances financially affected the pensioners, the ten-year
suspension of the cost-of-living adjustment benefit was temporary,
55. Id. at 581–82 (quoting Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 33 (1st
Cir. 2002)).
56. Id. at 582 (quoting Sherman v. Town of Chester, 752 F.3d 554, 564 (2d
Cir. 2014)).
57. Id. (quoting Sherman, 752 F.3d at 564 and Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v.
New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
58. Cranston Police Retirees Action Comm., 208 A.3d at 582 (quoting Penn
Central, 438 U.S. at 124).
59. Id.; See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
60. Cranston Police Retirees Action Comm., 208 A.3d at 582 (quoting
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005)).
61. Id. (quoting Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538).
62. Id. at 583.
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only impacted a part of the overall pension benefits received, and
did not affect the pensioners’ base payments or other benefits.63
Additionally, the 2013 ordinances concerned only future pension
benefits and did not affect any cost-of-living adjustment payments
made prior to its enactment, a move that was motivated by the
City’s need to hoist itself out of “critical status” as required by state
law and for the benefit of the pensioners.64 Thus, the Court found
that the ten-year suspension of the cost-of-living adjustment benefit
did not constitute a non-categorical taking necessitating just
compensation.65
Lastly, the Court sought to determine whether the City
violated the Open Meeting Act (OMA)66 when it proposed the 2013
ordinances at a meeting on March 25, 2013 without first placing it
on the meeting’s agenda.67 The Court reviewed this issue de novo
and noted its objective of construing the statute in light of the state
legislature’s intended purpose.68 The Court’s analysis focused upon
statutory construction and an examination concerning whether the
Plaintiff was within the class of individuals upon whom the
legislature conferred standing.69
The Court first considered the relevant sections of the OMA to
determine if the Plaintiff was within the “zone of interest” this
statute set out to protect.70 The Court focused on sections 42-468(a) and (c) of the OMA, which state in relevant part that: “Any
citizen or entity of the state who is aggrieved as a result of
violations of the provision of this chapter may file a complaint with
the attorney general,”71 and that

63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-46-8.
67. Cranston Police Retirees Action Comm., 208 A.3d at 585.
68. Id. at 586 (quoting South Cty. Post & Beam v. McMahon, 116 A.3d 204,
214–15 (R.I. 2015)).
69. Id. (quoting Tanner v. Town Council of East Greenwich, 880 A.2d 784,
792 n.6 (R.I. 2005)). The Court stated that it would not look at the eventual
success of the claim, but rather whether the plaintiff was in the vicinity of
people that the statute was intended to protect. Id. (quoting Tanner, 880 A.2d
at 792 n.6).
70. Id. (quoting Tanner, 880 A.2d at 792 n.6).
71. Id. at 587 (quoting § 42-48-8(a)).
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[n]othing within this section shall prohibit any individual
from retaining private counsel for the purpose of filing a
complaint . . . however, [] if the individual has first filed a
complaint with the attorney general . . . and the attorney
general declines to take legal action, the individual may
file suit in superior court . . . .72
The Court found that OMA sections 42-46-8(a) and (c) are
unambiguous as to what category of individuals have standing,
reasoning that the “plain language” of section 42-46-8(c) referred to
individuals only and not entities of the state.73 Thus, the Court
concluded that the Plaintiff, a non-profit corporation, did not having
standing to assert violations of the OMA.74
COMMENTARY
As Justice Robinson’s concurring opinion noted, although the
majority was correct in outcome, its analysis was particularly
troubling regarding the Plaintiff’s Contract Clause and OMA
claims.75 As for the Contract Clause claim, Justice Robinson
viewed it through a historical lens, arguing that the very nature of
this analysis required the Court to take an “absolutist” approach.76
In other words, the Court must adhere to the Framer’s ideologies
by protecting the rights provided by the Constitution in the manner
originally intended.77 Justice Robinson explained that the Contract
Clause prohibits “any law [from] impairing the obligation of
contracts.”78 Thus, as Justice Robinson correctly points out, the
Contract Clause’s rigid wording suggests that courts must adhere
to this “historically-based” approach to adequately protect the
rights the Framers set out to preserve.79 The majority, however,
departs from the Contract Clause’s strict approach by softening the

72. Id. (quoting § 42-48-8(c)) (emphasis added).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 592–93 (Robinson, J., concurring).
76. See id. at 593–94.
77. See id. at 594 (quoting Sveen v. Melin, 138 U.S. 1815, 1826–27 (2018)
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting)).
78. Id. at 593.
79. Id.
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analysis.80 As a result, Justice Robinson explained, although the
majority was correct in holding that the 2013 ordinances did not
violate the Contracts Clauses of the Rhode Island and United
States Constitutions, the unanticipated occurrences and
“temporally limited” nature of the contractual impairment made
this case far closer than the majority suggests.81
Turning to the Plaintiff’s OMA claim, Justice Robinson voiced
a similar critique of the majority’s analysis.82 He argued that,
although the majority was correct in its determination of whether
the 2013 ordinances violated the OMA, there was no sound public
policy for allowing individuals, but not entities, to file a
complaint.83
One can interpret Justice Robinson’s view as
suggesting that the legislature should address this issue, however,
one can also interpret it as questioning why the majority failed to
discuss public policy.84
Interestingly, the majority opinion and concurrence illuminate
a discrepancy as to when the circumstances allow for an “absolute”
versus a flexible approach in deciding constitutional and statutory
issues. The Court’s disagreement regarding the appropriate
Contract Clause approach is particularly troubling. As stated
earlier, in Justice Robinson’s eyes the Contract Clause question
presented in this case was much closer than the majority
suggests.85 Even assuming this, however, the troubling fact that
the “closeness” of this case depended upon the approach employed
runs afoul of the fundamental and traditional goals of the judiciary.
Predictability and consistency are significant aspirations that
courts seek to achieve through precedent. However, with judges
advocating for different analytical approaches to resolve Contract
Clause issues, this troubling discrepancy will continue to reappear
in subsequent cases. In fact, this discrepancy did reappear in
Herbert v. City of Woonsocket,86 where the majority again applied a

80. See id.
81. Id. (emphasis in original).
82. See id. at 594–95.
83. Id. at 595. The concurrence simply points out that entities are made
up of individuals and suggests that they deserve the same treatment. Id. at
595 n.23.
84. See id. at 595.
85. Id.
86. See 213 A.3d 1065, 1084–88 (R.I. 2019).
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softened Contract Clause analysis, while Justice Robinson
maintained the “absolutists” position he advocated for in this
case.87 Thus, it is clear that this difference of opinion will persist
throughout subsequent cases involving Contract Clause claims.88
Although the manner of analysis did not appear to affect the “just”
outcome in either of these cases,89 the likelihood that this
discrepancy may negatively affect future cases is readily apparent.
Thus, clarity is of substantial importance to promote consistency
and predictability for the benefit of litigants and the courts. This is
not to say that either approach is “correct,” as such a conclusion
would be incomplete without appreciating the reasons for why the
court should apply a particular approach to Contract Clause
questions, but simply that clarity is wanting.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the enactment of a
ten-year suspension of the cost-of-living adjustment benefit for the
City of Cranston police officer and firefighter retirees enrolled in
the city’s pension plan did not violate the Contract Clauses of the
Rhode Island or United States Constitutions because the 2013
ordnances served a “significant and legitimate public purpose,” and
were “reasonable and necessary” under the circumstances.90
Moreover, the 2013 ordinances did not constitute a taking under
the Takings Clauses of the Rhode Island and United Stated
Constitutions because, although the retirees’ cost-of-living
adjustment was a “vested benefit,” the ordinances were temporary
and only affected a small portion of the pensioners’ overall
benefits.91 Lastly, the Plaintiff could not assert a violation of the
OMA because the Plaintiff was a non-profit corporation, and, thus,
did not have standing to bring suit under the statute.92
Tyler Martin
87. See id. at 1093 (Robinson, J., concurring).
88. See Cranston Police Retirees Action Comm., 208 A.3d at 593–94
(Robinson, J., concurring); Herbert, 213 A.3d at 1093 (Robinson, J., concurring).
89. See Cranston Police Action, 208 A.3d at 593–94 (Robinson, J.,
concurring); Herbert, 213 A.3d at 1093 (Robinson, J., concurring).
90. Cranston Police Retirees Action Comm., 208 A.3d at 578.
91. Id. at 583.
92. Id. at 587.

